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AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS' AND OVERHAULERS'
LIABILITY FOR DEFECTS IN CONSTRUCTION, DESIGN
AND OVERHAUL - THE EXTENSION OF THE
MACPHERSON V. BUICK RULE FROM THE
TERRESTRIAL TO THE CELESTIAL
DANIEL E. MURRAY*
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to survey the American, Canadian and
British Commonwealth cases which have expressly or impliedly recognized
the liability of the aircraft manufacturer and overhauler for negligent
construction, design or overhaul of aircraft which results in injury or
property damage to the manufacturer's immediate vendees, remote vendees
and third persons.
In the famed case of MacPherson v. Buick,' a bdte noire to the manufacturer, Justice Cardozo enunciated the basic principle:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a
thing of danger .... If to the element of danger there is added
knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the
purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract
the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make
it carefully . . . . There must also be a knowledge that in the
usual course of events the danger will be shared by others than
the buyer ....
We are dealing now with the liability of the
manufacturer of the finished product, who puts it on the market
to be used without inspection by his customers.
The court was concerned with the liability of the manufacturer of
the finished product and not the manufacturer of a component part. The

latter question remained for Smith v. Peerless Glass Co.,2 wherein a broad
rule of liability was applied to any negligent manufacturer, whether of an
assembled article or a component part thereof.
The MacPherson and Peerless Class cases left unanswered the questions:
(1.) What is the liability of the manufacturer to vendees buying used
articles? (2.) What is the liability of the manufacturer to the immediate
'Assistant

Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.

1. 217 N.V. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See also RSTA.TEME.NT, iTORS §§ 395,
398 (1934). For an entertaining fictionalized account of the MacPherson case by an
attorney to his client, see Parker, The Most Outrageous Consequences, in LAw IN
AcTION, 427-432 (Fuller ed. 1947).

2. 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932).
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or remote vcndecs when the alleged defect does not cause an "accident,"
but necessitates expensive repairs? (3.) 1ltas the MacPherson doctrine been
extended to inchide overhaulers or repairmen as well as the original
manufacturer? This article will attempt to answer these and other questions
in connection with aircraft manufacturers and overlhaulers.3
Breach of Warranty
At the outset it should be emjphasizcd that a breach of warranty
theory will be of little avail in avation cases. Under the orthodox view, if the
plaintiff is not in privity with the manufacturer there can be no breach of warranty.4 Florida seems to follow the "unorthodox" v'iew." Even assuming there
is direct privity between the manufacturer and the airline vendee, the purchase
contract mav curtail or eliminate any claim for breach of warranty.
In a recent case, Smith v. Piper Air Craft Corporation," the plaintiff
in a wrongful death action alleged that Piper breached its warranty and
was negligent in the construction of an aircraft. The court apparently overlooked the question of privity and pcriittcd the breach of warranty claim
even though the aircraft had been purchased from an intermediate dealer.'
Is the MacPherson Doctrine Applicable In a Suit by the Immediate Vendee
3. Because of the various relatiOrishiips involved, and tire technical nature of aircraft,
this article wiill be divided into sections dealing with these questions.
4. Page v. Cameron Iron Works. ine,, 155 F.Sopp. 283 (S.D. Tex. 1957),
hinoged on a qoestion of fact. 2;,) F.2d 420, 421, n. I (5th Cir. 19 ): PossR.1t, lfuirs
§ 84 (2d ed. 1955); note, Airplane Warranties. 19 No-Ris, 1Vhran. LAN' 144 (1943).
In Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1957 U.S. & Can. Av. 247 (1). Del. 1957), the
district court held that since there was no privity there would be no cause of action for
breach of warranty. Te court of appeals sidestepped the question by finding no breach
of implied warranty on the facts of the case. Prashker v, Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d
602 (3rd Cir, 1958).
4a, Although the Florida conirts have not decided any aviation cases involving this
rinestiim, the result but not the reasoning seenis clear in cases concerning: (electrical
wiring) Continental Copper and Steel Indus. Inc, v. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So,2d 40
(Fia. App. 1958); (agricultural seed) Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So.2d 514
(Fla. 1953); (lawn fmnrnittire) Matthews v, L.awnlite. 88 So,2d 299 (Fla. 1956); (canned
meat) Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872. 19 So.2d 113 (1944). The opinion
in the Mattlhew case indicated that the corrt confused the implied warranty concept
with the McPherson doctrine.
;, Northwest Airlines. Inc. v. Glen L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied. 350 U.S. 937 (1956). Northwest filed a further suit against Martin asking
for indemnity for atnonts paid in settling passenger claims. The decision in this case
was confined to the timeliness of the suit under ihe Wisconsin Statute of Limitations.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glen L. Martin Co., 5 Av. Cas. 18069 (D. Md. 1958).
6. 18 F.R.D. 169 (M.D. Pa, 1955). 'lhis view received court affirmance by the
same court in the later case of Lyon v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 1958 U.S. & Can. Av. 12
(M.D. Pa. 1958).
7, The first reported aviation warranty case, Sellers 'Motor Co. v. Champion Spark
Plug Co.. 1 0 MiNss. 47,. 116 So. S83 (1929), would appear after a cursory inspection
to have disregarded the privitx factor. 1lhrwever, the facts seelnnud to indicate that ie
of the plaintiffs puirchased spark p)lugs from a hardware store salesman and the salesman
of the ruanufactlirer by relying npon their representations. The spark plugs were shipped
directly to the plaintiff by the iauufacturr with payrrent being made to the intermediate
dealer. A written warranty or guaranty came with the plugs and it was upon this written
warranty that the plaintiff relied. The court made no mention of the privity aspect, but
held for tle defendant upon the lack of evidence that tire spark plugs failed causing the
injury to the plaintiff and the aircraft.
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Against the Manufacturer When There Is "Cooperation"
In the Manufacturing Press?
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Company,j Northwest
brought suit against Martin for negligent design and construction of the
Martin "202" aircraft which had developed fatigue failures in the wing
joints, causing the crash and total destruction of one aircraft and necessitating the re-building of twenty-four other aircraft. During the aircraft's construction Northwest had stationed one resident engineer, two or three of
its inspectors and a group of pilots to "observe the day-by-day manufacture
of the airplanes." Nevertheless, the court ruled that there was a complete
absence of proof that Northwest's inspectors had any knowledge or appreciation of any risk of danger associated with the design, material, workmanship, or the testing of the faulty wing joints. it was therefore error
for the court to submit questions of contributory negligence and assumption
of the risk to the jur'. Itis submitted that the court ruled properly on the
"volunteer" or "affirmative conduct"9 concept of tort law. It
appears
from this case that the airline vendee does not have a duty to inspect
and that it may make a careless inspection and still recover against the
manufacturer, provided that the manufacturer does not rely upon the
inspectionY

The Inapplicability of the MacPherson Doctrine In a Suit By the Ultimate
Vendee Against a Manufacturer of a Component Part of the
Aircraft When No "Accident" Occurs
The MacPherson case and
to accidents. Therefore an airline
manufacturer (a remote vendor)
did not tausc an accident," but

its progeny have confined the doctrine
had no cause of action against an engine
for latent defects in the engines which
simply necessitatcd expensive repairs to

8. 224 F,2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955).
9. PROSSER, TORTS § 38 (2d ed. 1955).
10. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 221 F.2d 120, 127 (6th

Cir. 1955).
'['here was no evidence that Martin did any' action or refrained from taking any

action in the design, manufactnre, or testing of the critical wing splice in reliance

upon Northwest's inspection. Where one undertakes an act which he has no
dty
to perform, and another reasonalbI" TelieS Upon that undertaking, the act

must generally be performed with ordinary care .... That, however, is not this
case. There was no evidence that Martin relied in any way upon the inspections

made by Northwest, with respect to the airplanes generally or the wing joint in
particular. That being so, we fail to see how the inspections which were made
by Northwest contributed in any way to the damage it sustained. A negligent
defendant is exculpated from liability to a defendant who has increased the
risk of harn to himself over what the risk would have been had he exercised
ordinary care. Here it is conceded that in the exercise of ordinary care Northwest
need not have made any inspection of the airplanes at all. If Northwest had
made no inspection it is obvious that the risk of danger in the wing joints
would have been no greater and no less than it actually turned out to be. The
fact that inspections were made in no way increased the risk of harm.
II. The defects allegedly caused the crash of one of the plaintiff's aircraft. liowever,
this cause of action was not involved in the reported ease, note 12 infra.
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the engines. The airline was not without remedy because it had recourse
against its immediate vendor, the airplane nanufacturer, for breach of
warranty. As the court stated:
If the ultimate user were allowed to sue the manufacturer in
negligence merely because an article with latent defects turned out
to be bad when used in "regular service" without any accident
occurring, there would be nothing left of the citadel of privity
2
and not much scope for the law of warranty ....
Should 'The Doctrine Be Applicable In a Suit By the Ultimate
Vendee Against Overhaulers and Repairmen?
The MacPherson case dealt with the liability of the manufacturer
of a new article. The relatively few reported cases in aviation have extended
this doctrine (or related English doctrines) to include overhaulers and
repairmen. In the Canadian decision of McCoy et al v. Stinson,' 3 the
defendant manufacturer of an aircraft later welded a "gusset" to a plate
on the aircraft's wing. The aircraft later crashed, killing the pilot whose
intestate sued. The court stated that the evidence failed to prove that the
plate was weakened by the welding and that the evidence demonstrated
that the welding was pcrformcd properly. The court determined that the
defendant would not be guilty of negligence even if the welding had
been improperly performed, since it did not lcsscn the plate's capacity
to withstand a tension load. The court did not mention the MacPherson
doctrine but rested its decision on the McAlister 4 case which apparently
is the English equivalent.
In the New Zealand case of Maindonald v. Marlborough Aero Club
and New Zealand Airways, Ltd.,' the defendant repairer overhauled an
12. Trans.,Vorld Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright, I Misc, 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d
284 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd,, 2 A.D,2d 666, 153 N.Y.S,2d 546 (1955). See Thornton &
NieNice, Torts and \ orkinen's Compensation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1499 (1956) for a

trenchant criticism of the court's view that an "accident" must be involved before
liability arises.
13. McCoy v. Stinson Aircraft Corp., 1940 U.S.Av. 84, 1942 U.S.Av. 154 (Ontario

Sup. Ct. 1939),
14, The English rule of liability of the manufacturer seems to have had its genesis
in the case of McAlister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson, I.L. (Sc.) [19321 A.C. 562,
which held the manufacturer of a bottle of ginger beer liable for iniuries to a consumer
when she discovered a snail in the bottle. Prior to her consumption of the liquid she was
unable to detect the presence of the snail because the bottle was opaque. The House of

Lords held that where the circnmstances preclude any distributor or consumer from
discovering the defect by an independent or intervening inspection, then the manufacturer

has a duty to take reasonable care that the article is free from defects likely to cause
injury to health. It is interesting to note that the various Lords who took part in the
decision either approved the McPherson rule or attempted to distiiguish it. It would
appear that any distinction is more verbal than real. The McAllister theory was later
applied in Ilerschtal v. Stewart & Arden, Ltd., 119401 1 K.B. 155 which involved a

used auto which had been supplied by the defendant to a company which in turn "hired
it ott" to the plaintiff. While being used tho wheel came off injuring the plaintiff who

recovered from the supplier because it did not and could not have reasonably anticipated
that there would be any independent examination which would likely reveal the defect.
For a complete review and analysis of the English view. see Iletston, Donoghue v.
Stevenson in Retrospect, 20 MODrRN I-l REv. I (British 1957).

15. 119331 N.Z.L.R. 371.
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aircraft for a flying club. A cotter key (which kept the elevator control
lever in position) either came loose in flight or was never properly
installed during repair causing the elevator controls to fail resulting in
the crash of the aircraft and the death of the plaintiff's intestate. The
aircraft had been inspected by government officials prior to flight and
had been certified as airworthy. The court relieved the repairer of all
liability, primarily because the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant
was at fault, but in addition because there was thus "an opportunity of
independent examination between the manufacturer and the consumer."I
In the first American decision the court predicated its decision squarely
upon the MacPherson rule. An aircraft took off and immediately after
leaving the ground a propeller blade snapped off. The vibration shook
the engine loose and the remaining propeller blade cut the aileron cables;
the plane went out of control, killing all the occupants. The defendant
overhauler (who also was the original manufacturer) had reconditioned
the propellers approximately three months prior to the crash, but had
overlooked the presence of "tool marks" on the inner surface of the
propeller hub which would increase the probability of a fatigue failure of
the hub. The court ruled that since these tool marks could have bcen
discovered during a reasonable examination and the defendant overhauler
knew that these marks were a grave source of danger, and neither reported
that fact nor the existence of the marks to the airline, the overhauler failed
in its duty. The airline had a right to rely upon the overhauler's performance and could recover for thc loss of the aircraft, together with
the damages that it was forced to pay for the passengers' death.' 7 It is
interesting to note that while the court based its decision upon MacPlherson,
it failed to realize that the doctrine had been slightly extended.
In the fourth decision it was decided that where the plaintiff purchased an aircraft' from Beech Aircraft which was later returned for
repair to Beech, and which subsequently crashed, the MacPherson rule
applied to both manufacturers and repairmen.'
Is the Doctrine Applicable In Suits By Military and Civilian Passengers
In Government Aircraft Versus the Manufacturer?
20
Prior to the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act the federal
government was immune from suits by civilian passengers in government

16. The holding of the McAllister case was thus distinguished.
17. American Airways. Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.. 170 Misc. 721, 10 N.Y.S.2d 816
(Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd without opinion, 258 App. Div. 957, 17 N.Y.S,2d 998 (1940),
aff'd mer.. 284 N.Y. 807, 31 N.E.2d 925 (1940).
18. Whether the aircraft was new or used is not certain from the case.
19. Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950).
20, The
28 U.S.C.
1346(b), 2674 (1948). § 1346(I);
district§§courts
. . . shall have exclusive jurisdictions of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1,
1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
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aircraft. The passenger's only recourse was against the negligent manufacturer of the aircraft. The Tort Claims Act has not changed the rule
that a serviceman, while on duty, may not recover against the Governecut;21 his only recourse is against the manufacturer.
In the first suit - - involving a serviceman and a government aircraft,
the court decided '' that the plaintiff stated a case of action when she
alleged that the defendant aircraft manufacturer had furnished drawings
to the Navy which the Navy relied upon in the overhauling and modifying
of Grumman
aircraft. The drawings were allegedly defective in failing to
reflect a contrivance necessary to maintain the pilot's seat in a fixed position;
as a result, the plaintiff's intestate was ejected and killed. It should be
recalled that the MacPherson case involved a tangible "thing," while
here tihe 'thing' was a drawing. In addition, it is difficult to believe that
21
the Navy would not subject the aircraft to independent inspection.
The second case", involved a seat which would not eject and a civilian
aviation expert who, prior to his taking a demonstration ride in a govern.
ment jet aircraft, executed a government form covenant not to sue.26 The
jet crashed killing the civilian. It was held that the civilian's intestate was
barred from suing the Government unless the death "was the result of
willful, wanton, or gross negligence on the part, of the government, or any
of its agents, officers or employees." However, the covenant not to sue
did not release the aircraft manufacturer from liability for its negligent
construction of the scat ejection mechanism. The court cited no authority
for the liability of the manufacturer.
In North American Aviation, Inc. v. Hughes, -3 the manufacturer
delivered a jet fightcr to the Air F'orce at the factory. On the take-off the
aircraft exploded, killing the military pilot. The court of appeals upheld
a jury finding that the aircraft exploded because of a faulty electrical
system, despite the forceful contention of the manufacturer that there
negligent or wrongfol act or Omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, wotld be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occorred.
§2674; "The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual tinder like circumstanees, bt shall not be
liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages."
21. Fcres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
22. Gladstone v. Cromnian Aircraft Eng. Co., 254 App. Div. 871, 5 N.Y.S.2d 252

(1938).
23. In a memorandum decision.
24. It is to be recalled that Justice Cardozo stated in the MacPherson case, 27 N.Y.
at 385, 111 N.E. at 1053; "If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that

the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests,

then,

...

the nanufacturer of this tiing of danger is tinder a doty to make it care-

fully .
(Emphasis added.)
25. 'riedmoan v. ockheed Aircraft Corp., 138 F. Stpp. 530 (E.1).N.Y. 1956).

26. This seems to be an attempt of the Government to escape the liabilities of the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
27. 247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958).
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was evidence that the pilot was relatively inexperienced in instrument
flying.X Inasmuch as the evidence indicated that the aircraft was destroyed
by a mid-air explosion, it is difficult to understand the relevancy of the
evidence of the pilot's inexperience in instrument flying.
Should the MacPherson Principle Be Extended to Impose Liability On the
Manufacturer-Sellers of Used Aircraft?
Although the Ford Motor Company,'1 Vrooman , " McCoy,a31 and
DeVito32 cases involved used aircraft, the decisions were based on subsequent negligent overhaul or modifications rather than on any defects
in original design or construction. Breen v. Conn;" apparently is the only
case which involved the liability of a used aircraft seller which also happened
to be the manufacturer. A Waco aircraft crashed killing all occupants.
The plaintiff's intestate sued the pilot's estate and the Waco Company,
alleging that the company sold an aircraft which wvas structurally weak.
The allegations were that a previous accident had damaged the wing and
that the wing was structurally designed so that frequent accidents involving
its vings could be reasonably expected. The court stated:
This innovation (MacPherson v. Buick) in the law of torts applies
to a new automobile and it likewise applies to the purchase of new
airplanes. However, the rule cannot be applicable to the sale of a
second-hand airplane under the allegations of the Plaintiff's
petition.
The last sentence of this statement has been characterized by one writer
as a dictum.34 However, it is the view of the writer that this sentence
necessarily referred to the allegations that the wing "was structurally of
such a design as to be susceptible to flying accidents" and further "that
the said company permitted this airplane, which was structurally weak
and faultily designed, to be sold and used for the purpose of flying . , . "
Under this interpretation, the Breen case is an outright refusal to extend
the MacPherson doctrine to used aircraft. The doctrine has been extended
to the ultimate purchaser of a used automobile and the purchaser of a
used refrigerator2. If the ultimate purchaser can show that the proximate
cause of his injuy .was due to the inherently defective design or construction of the aircraft (rather than any intervening cause) there does not
seem to be any logical reason for denying him recovery.
28. The accident occurred tinder instrument flight conditions.

29. 170 Misc. 721, 10 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sop. Ct. 19401).
30. 183 F,2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950).
31. 1940 U.S. Av. 84, 1942 U.S. Av. 154 (Ontario Sup. Ct. 1939).
32. 98 F. Supp. 88 (D.C. NY. 1951).

33. 30 Ohio L. Abs. 483 (1938).

34. Dominik, Atauofacturer's Liability In Aircraft Accidents, 16 J. AIR L. & Coia.

240 (1949).
35. Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 I11.App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951); Qtuckenbush
v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131 (1915).
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Should the Peerless Glass Principle Be Utilized In Aviation?
In Livesley v. Continental Motors Corporation,3 the plaintiff purchased
a new Cessna aircraft from a dealer. Cessna installed an engine purchased
from the Continental Motors Corporation which had purchascd the connecting rods from the Atlas Conpany; the Atlas Company had purchased
the steel from Bethlehem Steel Company. The engine failed in flight,
causing the aircraft to crash. Thc plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer of the engine, rather than the manufacturer of the aircraft, The
court held that the apparent cause of the failure of the engine was a
fatigue fracture of a connecting rod caused by "inclusion pits" of nonmetallic substances. However, these inclusion pits could not have been discovered by "reasonable inspection" through the use of a magniflux machine,
the standard device used in the aviation industry. Therefore, there was
insufficient evidence to show negligence of the engine manufacturer. The
court based its ruling squarely upon the MacPherson and the Peerless Glass
cases.
In Carter Carburetor Corporation Y. Riley,37 the plaintiff purchased a
Carter nechanical fuel pump from a dealer. The fuel pump failed in
flight causing the aircraft to crash. The plaintiff alleged, and the evidence
disclosed, that the pump was carelessly manufactured., The court upheld
a jury verdict against the manufacturer. The manufacturer's contentions
were that the accident occurred in Alberta, Canada, and (as the defendant
construed the law of Canada) the plaintiff failed to establish the essential
factors necessary to entitle him to recover because lie was a remote
vendee. This defense was summarily brushed aside by the court.-" It
would appear that this case is a tacit affirmation of the MacPherson
rather than the Peerless doctrine.
Should the Principle Be Extended to Strangers to the Sale, e.g., Passengers?
In Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation,40 the executrix
of a deceased passcnger brought suit against the airline and the manu36. 331 Mich. 434, 49 N.W.2d 365 (1951).
37. 186 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1951).
38. The mating surfaces of the castings were carelessly machined so that they were
uneven. The two screws that held the two sections of the pump together were not tight.
The edge of the rubber composition circular diaphram or gasket was not in place between
the clamping surfaces; if the diaphram were pulled in, there resulted an air leak in the
foe pressure system so that the gasoline supply to the engine failed. Further, the evidence
showed that the pump was originally designed as an automobile fuel pump for a maximum
pressure of five and one-half pounds with a pressure test resistance of twenty pounds.
As an aviation pump the defendant knew it would be subjected to maximum operating
pressures of approximately fifteen pounds and the usual safety factor would require a
pressure test of forty to sixty pounds.
39. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. Riley, 186 F.2d 148, 150 (8th Cir. 1951): "We
think we need not concern ourselves with the law of Alberta, Canada, nor, indeed, need

we inquire whether the law of Canada is different from the applicable law of Minnesota

(the state where the fuel pump was purchased). The court's instructions, not being
excepted to by either party, became the law of the case and we must determine the

question of the sufficiency of the evidence by the law as so announced."
40. 29 F. Supp. 112 (1). Conn. 1939).
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facturer, the latter having sold a defective engine cylinder to the airline. 4'
The engine manufacturer implcaded the Bethlehem Steel Company on
a theory of breach of warranty and negligence in the sale of the forging
which had been machined into the cylinder. This case has been cited
for the proposition that even though the airline fails to inspect and is
adjudged guilty of secondary negligence as to the passenger, it may recover
its losses from a manufacturer who has been primarily negligent.42 It is
submitted that the decision authorized impleading of Bethlehem Steel
Company under the federal rules, but required that Bethlehem's plea
of improper venue be sustained; therefore, Bethlehem was dropped as a
third party defendant. The case did not mention negligence and liability,
but related solely to questions of procedure. In the subsequent Lewis43
case tile federal court refused to sanction a declaratory action by tile airline
against the manufacturer petitioning for the cost of the lost aircraft
together with all amounts that the airline "may be required or compelled
to pay as damages for the death of the passengers." The manufacturer did
not question its ultimate liability to the airline for damages which the
airline eventually would have to pay to the estates of the deceased
passengers. However, the court, for policy reasons, dismissed the claim
because of the impossibility of obtaining jurisdiction over the "strangerplaintiffs" (passengers) and defendants in one jurisdiction. The court stated
that if some plaintiffs brought suit in one jurisdiction and won, and
others sued in a different jurisdiction and lost, there might result a conflict
which could not be properly reconciled.
In Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corporation44 a passenger' 5 recovered
from the aircraft manufacturer for injuries she suffered when the aircraft
caught fire on the ground. She alleged four acts of negligence of the manufacturer.46 The judge charged the jury that the manufacturer had a duty
of care to be measured by the "mythical ordinary individual" who, in
1934 when the aircraft was designed, was ordinarily skilled in the designing
of aircraft and aircraft engines. The report of this case consists of the
judge's charges to the jury which seem to be in accord with the "duty"
concept enunciated in the MacPherson case.
41. This allegedly resulted in the crash of an aircraft and the death of the plaintiff's
interstate.
42. Note, Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability For Defects In Construction and Design,
14
23) . Ain L. & CoM. 108 (1956

43. 34 F. Supp. 124 (D. onn. 1940).

44. 1 Av. Cas. 698 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1937).
45. Whether the plaintiff was a passenger in a common carrier or in a private carrier
was not indicated in the decision.
46. First that the exhaust stacks were not sufficiently high (only about one inch)
above the fuselage; second, that the exhaust stacks were too close to the carburetor drain;
third, that the carburetor drain was of such a design that fuel escaping from it would
adhere to the bottom of the fuselage, where it was in danger of being ignited by exhaust
gases- fourth, that this happened, or that there was a loss of gasoline from a leak inside
the airplane in such a way that the loss of gasoline from the leak got through the skin
of the fuselage and adhered to the bottom of the outside of the fuselage, and was ignited

by the exhaust gases.
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The two Canadian cases of Galer v. Wings, Ltd.-" and Nysted v.
Wings, Ltd . ' did not directly involve the manufacturer as a party
defendant. Howcver, the responsibility of the manufacturer was drawn
into the suit between the passengers and the airline. TIe two cases involved
the same accident and camie to diametrically opposite results.'" Soon after
the take off of an aircraft, the propeller blade snapped off; the resulting
unequal vibration tore the cgine loose from its mounting and the plane
crashed, seriously injurinig the occupants. In the Galer case the court held
that the propeller blade failed because of an improper design by the
manufacturer which caused a fatiguc failure in the metal. The airline was
held blameless because there was insufficient knowledge of fatigue and
its development in the aviation industry at the time of the accident. The
American manufacturer of the propeller was not joined and therefore was
not bound by the decision. In the Nysted case, the court concluded that
the airline was at fault in that it ordered an incomplete repair of the
propeller prior to the accident; the airline had knowledge of the fact that
the manufacturer had recommended that this type propeller be discontinued or only used on engines of much less horse-power, and prior
vibration in the flight of the aircraft was sufficient warning to the airline
of the possibility of fatigue failure of the propeller.
The classic case of De Vito v. United Air Lines, Inc." " completes the
full mosaic in the development of the MacPherson principle. Fires of undetermined origin occurred in some of the airline's aircraft. All aircraft
of this type (DC 6) were grounded and a modification panel was established under the direction of the manufacturer.
aircraft were modified
in accordance with the drawings and specifications furnished by the manufacturer. Subsequently, one of the modified aircraft crashed, killing all
occupants. The evidence indicated that the crash was caused by "annoxia"
of the pilots occurring when they released carbon dioxide to extinguish a
fire. The court determined that the airline and the manufacturer were
liable to the estates of the deceased passengers as joint tort feasors. However, the airline was authorized to recover from the manufacturer because
it was "actively" negligent in not disclosing that test flights had shown
dangerous accumulations of carbon dioxide in the cockpit and in not warning
the airlines to use oxygen masks of the "one hundred Percent" type when
carbon dioxide was released. An analysis of this case discloses significant
factual differences from the NfacPherson case. Drawings and specifications
were involved, not tangible things. The aircraft was used and liability was
imposed against the manufacturer for negligence in supplying defective
specifications used in the modification of the aircraft. In addition it would

nhe

47. 47 Man. IRep. 271, 3 NW.R. 47 (1938).

48. ;1 Man. Rep. 63, 3 D., R. 336 (1942).
49. It should be stated that the court in the Nysted case had the bcnefit of additional
evidence not presented to the court in the Galer case.
50. 98 P.

Supp. 88 (F.TJ.N.Y.

1951).
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appear that the "negligence" of the manufacturer was virtually deliberate
rather than inadvertent.
It might be supposed that Creat Britain, having suffered a series of
disastrous crashes involving the jet "Comct" airliner,' and having a farflung aerial transportation system, would have a well-decided rule of
liability of the manufacturer. Hlowever, just the converse appears to he
true. In Shaweross and Beaumont, Air LawtV -' it is stated:
A manufacturer who designs or constructs an aircraft negligently,
with the result that an accident occurs, may, in certain circumstances, be liable for any damage or injury thereby caused, either
to the owner . . or to a third party, such as a passenger or
pilot

.

.

.

. Claims

against

manufacturcrs

arising

from

air

disasters are most frequent in the U.S.A.
An examination of the numerous cases cited by the authors, discloses
not one British Commonwealth aviation case squarely in accord with this
statement 5 The only relevant cases cited were, unfortunately, from the
'4
United States. ,

Unadjudicated Problems Arising Under The MacPherson Principle.
Will the MacPherson principle apply if the accident occurs in an
area which does not recognize the principle? Under the usual conflicts
of law rule, the place where the accident happens determines the right
of recovery, rather than the place where the negligent act occurs.Ki
Inasmuch as nearly all the statcs have adopted the MacPherson principle
in some form,5-,, no great problem should arise when an aircraft crashes
within the territorial limits of the United States. If the aircraft crashes in

51. Gordon, He Found Out Why The Comets Blew Up, 227 No. 34 TiE SAT.
Eie POsT, at 28, (Feb, 19, 1955). It appears that some of the representatives of deceased
passengers have been suing in American rather than in British courts. Whether this is
because the majority of the passengers were American or that Americans are inore contentious than the British is debatable. The decisions have all involved questions of service
of process against the manufacturer De Havilland Aircraft Company without any determination on the merits. Anderson v. British Overseas Air Corp., 144 F. Supp. 543
(S.D. N.Y. 1956); State Street Trust Co. v. BOAC, 144 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
52. SIAWCROSs & BiAtMslN',', AIR LAw 521 (2d ed. 1951) and second cumulative
supplement to second edition 521 (1955).
53. The New Zealand case of Maindonald v. Marlborough Aero Club & New Zealand
Airways, Ltd., [19351 N.Z.L.R. 371 cited by the authors dealt with the liability of the
repairmen, see text in connection with note IH supra. The Alaindonald case did state that
there is no difference in principle between the liability of the manufacturer of a new
article and the repairman or overhanler of a used article.
54. Both McNAIR, THE LAW or TiHE AIR (Preface to 2d. ed. 1953) and SHAxWCROSS
& BEAUMONT, Are LAW 521 (2d ed. 1951) remark that American courts have decided
many more aviation cases than have the British c(llirts. It is submitted that a comparison
of the volunme of general case law between the two countries will disclose that this
phenomenon is not limited to aviation.
55. GOODRIrCH, CoNFLIC'r or LAws, §§ 89-91 (1938). RESFATim.MENT, CoxVm'.crs
§§ 378-382 (1934); Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 18 F.R.D. 169 (D. Pa. 1955) and
see Note, Conflict of Laws, Lex Locus Delicti Dicta, 12 U. NIIAi L. REv 244 (1958).
56. PRossER, 'oRis 500 (2d ed. 1955).
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a foreign country which does not have a similar rule, then the manufacturer
may be insulated from liability by fortuitous circumstances. If the accident
occurs over the high seas, which is not undcr the jurisdiction of any
'7
country, the manufacturer may be relieved of liability.

Will the MacPherson principle apply when aircraft crash because
of sonic negligence of the manufacturer and injure property and persons
on the ground? The person on the ground who is injured or whose property
is damaged can usually recover against the aircraft owner under the various

theories of negligence, trespass, absolute liability, and res ipsa loquitur.-"8
However, if the owner of the airplane can show that the fault lies with
the manufacturer, or the plaintiff is faced with the prospect of suing an
insolvent uninsured aircraft owner, can he recover directly against the
manufacturer who is to blame? Unfortunately the author has been unable
to find any aviation cases in point. The courts have definitely extended

the liability of the manufacturer to injured strangers and their property
in terrestrial 59 accidents and there does not seem to be any reason to
create a dichotomy.
57. See Comment, Death on the hligh Seas Act: Aviation Disaster Litigants confined
to the Admiralty Forum, 55 COms;. L, REv. 907 (1955), and the subsequent cases of
Iliga v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
802 (1956); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Fernandez v. L.A.V., 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Trihcy v. 'Iransocean Air Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958), cart, denied, 27
U.S.L. \eek 3102 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1958); D'Alcnon v. Pan American 'World Airways,
Inc., 259 F.2d 493 ( 2d Cir. 1958).
In the Trihey case the court seemed to assume that the overhanler and the manufacturer would be liable if they were negligent. The trial court found no negligence and
the court of appeals confined its attention to the applicability of the res ipsa loquitur
rule and its procedural effects. In regard to the lex loci rule see Pickens, Actions Arising
Out of Airplane Mishaps, 42 IOWA L., REv. 479, 482 (1957).
The case of Noel v. Airponents, Inc.. 27 U.S. L. WEEK, 2329 (1). N.J. 1959)
was decided after this article was set in print. The defendant had "inspected and serviced"
a Linea Aeropostal Venezuelana Air Lines aircraft prior to its departure. It exploded
in flight at a point approximately thirty miles off the coast of New Jersey with the result
that all on board were killed. '[he plaintiff did not sue the airline, but brought soit
against the defendant for its alleged negligence in the inspection and servicing. The
district court held that the libel in admiralty which alleged "the accident was caused
by the negligence of the agents and servants of Airponents, Incorporated, . . . who
had inspected and serviced the aircraft prior to its departure" stated a cause of action
trder the Death on the High Seas Act, note 57 supra. Te court, while admitting that
the question presented was a "novel one in the field of aviation law," relied upon a
statement in Wilson v. Transoccan Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1954)
as controlling; "a maritime tort is deemed to occur, not where the wrongful act or
omission had its inception, but where the impact of the act or omission produces such
injury as could give rise to a cause of action."
The decision seems somewhat questionable in its eugrafting of admiralty law concepts
into aviation law. Sec Ftxvi.,, Tin.- l.AW oi: AviATIoN 16-17 (3d ed. 1948). It is submitted that using admiralty substantive law concepts because the accident occurred over
the high seas and because the admiralty court has jurisdiction seems to be going beyond
the intent of Congress. See comment, Death on the High Seas Act, note 57 supra. The
court also failed to cite any authority for its tacit recognition of the liability of the
"servicing" defendant.
58. See Eubank. Land DIamage Liability in Aircraft Cases, 57 Dic. L, Ri:v. 188
(1953) and Vold, Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings on Ground
Victims, 5 llAsirNcs L. J. I (1953).
59. PRossER, TosTS 501 (2d ed. 1955).
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Will an injured plaintiff be able to recover not only from the manufacturer but from the federal government which has exclusive jurisdiction
over the inspection and approval of the manufacturer of aircraft and
aircraft components? It has been suggested that since inspection and
approval by the Civil Aeronautics Authority requires such a high degree
of technical skill and judgment, the Authority's acts are discretionary in
nature rather than ministerial. Under this theory the Government would
not be liable. 0 Two recent cases indicate that the Government's irnmunity may soon be lost. In Union Trust Company v. United States"' the
Government was held liable for the negligence of its control tower operator
which resulted in the destruction of two aircraft and the loss of many
lives. A comparison of the duties of control tower operators and inspectors
will dcmonstrate that the amount of discretion and judgment exercised
by both is not too dissimilar. In Fields v. United States 2 the plaintiff
alleged that an airline repaired, rebuilt, overhauled and inspected one of
its aircraft; that the Civil Aeronautics Administration controlled, inspected
and supervised the work and that the aircraft crashed through the negligence of the C.A.A. killing the intestate. The decision mainly concerned
the right of the Government to implead the airline as a third party
defendant. The case did not state that the Government was liable but
there seemed to be a tacit assumption of liability. It is submitted that
treating the Government in the same category as a manufacturer is not
a too extreme extension of the MacPherson rule.
Conclusion
It has been judicially recognized that today's aircraft are incredibly
complicated, consisting of thousands of parts and components. 3 It is
also fairly obvious that aircraft are subjected to stresses and strains that
far exceed the stresses that automobiles are subjected to. It would seem,
after a casual analysis, that perhaps the MaePherson rule should not be
applicable to this new medium of transportation and manufacture which
has to make constant improvements in order to meet competition and to

60. See Hotchkiss, Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability and the Civil Aeronautics Act

of 1938, 16 GCeo. WASH. L. Rev. 469 (1948), and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (1948): "The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this
title shall not apply to (a) any claim hased upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, inthe execution of a statute or regulation, whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or dnty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be

abused."

61. 221 F.2d 62 (D.C.Cir. 1955), rev'd per curiaru, 350 U.S. 907 (1956), and see
Note, Discretionary Function Exception of Federal Tort Claims Act, 12 U. Miami L.
Rev. 247 (1958).
62. 5 Av. Cas. 17, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1957): But see the sketchily reported case of Lee
v. United States, 5 Av. Cas. 17857 (N.D. Tex. 1957), which seemingly is contra.
63. North American Aviation, Inc. v. Hughes, 247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957).
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solve unforeseen aerodynamic problems as they arise. However, as a matter
of social policy, it would appear that liability should be and has been
plaecd upon the manufacturer who can best avoid the defects and who
can include the cost of "due care" in the price of his product which is
eventually paid for by the flying public and the Federal Government in
the form of subsidies to the airlines.6"

64. See TilOXIAS, ECONOMIC REULATION OF SCHi:DULE-D AIR 'RANSPOR'r, 128-146
1951) and Justice Jackson's dissent in 'ranscontiuental & Western Airlines, Inc. v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, 336 U.S. 601, 608 (1949).

